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Abstract
There seems to be a difficulty in the practice of metaphysics, in that
any methodology used in metaphysical study relies on certain presuppo-
sitions, whereby it seems that metaphysical results are relative to those
presuppositions. What is needed is a methodology that can yield objec-
tive metaphysical results that are not limited by the presuppositions of
that methodology. This paper argues for a way to triangulate on sta-
ble metaphysical results by using existing methodologies as perspectives
on metaphysical topics, and by reducing the differences between those
perspectives to non-perspectival truths, if possible.
1 The Question of Methodology in Metaphysics
It seems that the question of methodology arises in general in cases where there
is a problem or difficulty in accessing something. So, for example, one might
indeed raise the question of the best method to access a deposit of gold or silver
buried deeply under many layers of rock. Yet where access is clear, the question
of methodology does not seem to arise. If there is a jewel lying on the ground
directly in front of me, I do not question the best method of accessing that
jewel. I typically would simply reach down and pick it up.
So asking a question concerning the methods for investigating metaphysics
would seem to imply that there is some problem in metaphysics with access to
something. However, it is not immediately clear what is supposed to be accessed
in metaphysics.
For Immanuel Kant, the question of access arises with regard to things-in-
themselves, which are not directly accessible, but only mediated by concepts of
the pure understanding [Kant 1999]. However, it seems that the structure of
this apparent problem itself contains a key to its own solution. The method for
practicing metaphysics according to Kant consists in performing a critique of
pure reason and uncovering those concepts that are necessary in order to make
science possible.
However, as Arthur Schopenhauer points out, there is at least one thing-
in-itself that is directly accessible, namely the inquirer, who is a thing-in-itself
that is self-accessible [Schopenhauer 1966]. As an inquirer, I might indeed rep-
resent myself to myself, and the resulting representation would still fall within
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Kant’s critique as being mediated by concepts. Yet Schopenhauer emphasizes
that there is another aspect in which the inquirer might appear, namely not
as representation, but as will. In the exercise of my will, I seem to transcend
the representational gap between subject and object and to bypass the need to
mediate access to myself as thing-in-itself through concepts.
One might see Martin Heidegger’s metaphysical methodology as a variation
on Schopenhauer’s insight. For Heidegger, one is always already thrown in
the world and therefore immersed in being. However, there is a problem in
accessing this primordial sense of being, since it is obscured by the concepts
by which any inquirer represents various beings, including the inquirer himself.
Here again, it seems that the structure of the apparent problem contains a key
to its own solution. The method for recovering the primordial nature of being
for Heidegger consists in focusing on the inquirer as Dasein, one whose being
is an issue for itself, and in making Dasein’s own being transparent to itself
through phenomenological analysis [Heidegger 1962].
Yet Heidegger’s method presupposes that the primordial constitution of be-
ing is something that can be made transparent through the inquirer according
to some methodology. Perhaps being is something that is always obscured by
the very act of inquiring. Perhaps the only way to access being as such is to
stop inquiring at all, possibly by sitting in deep meditation. Of course, Heideg-
ger seems to acknowledge this presupposition, but denies that it is problematic.
Rather, it represents a kind of hermeneutic circle according to which one can
determine whether this methodological approach is correct “only after one has
gone along with it” [Heidegger 1962, p. 487].
Unfortunately, it would seem that every methodology relies on certain pre-
suppositions, and it is not clear that only Heidegger’s phenomenological method
would constitute a hermeneutical circle in this regard. This observation would
apply also to more recent analytical methods, whether characterized in terms
of an analysis of language, or intuitions, or possible worlds, all of which rely
on certain presuppositions. Thus it seems that the fundamental problem in the
question of methodology for metaphysics, and indeed for all of philosophy, is
that the presuppositions of the various methods for practicing metaphysical in-
quiry are not perfectly innocent, but constrain and shape the inquiry such that
the results conform to those presuppositions. It would therefore seem necessary
to investigate those presuppositions to test which are valid and which are not.
However, such an investigation itself would seem to require the employment of
some philosophical methodology, and that methodology would seem either to
introduce further presuppositions that would need to be investigated, or to rely
on the same presuppositions that are under investigation.
Framing the problem in this way does not seem to offer any clear solution,
so in order to make any progress on this problem, it may need to be approached
more obliquely, from a different angle. Rather than evaluating the presupposi-
tions to determine which are correct, I propose using those presuppositions as
varying perspectives on metaphysics and seeking a way to triangulate on stable
metaphysical results using those perspectives. As background for this proposal,
I will start by reviewing the different attitudes toward presuppositions taken by
2
R. G. Collingwood and Edmund Husserl.
2 Collingwood and Husserl on Presuppositions
R. G. Collingwood expounds a view of the nature of metaphysics precisely in
terms of presuppositions, in accordance with his logic of question and answer.
Collingwood claims that every proposition represents an answer to some ques-
tion, where each question has certain presuppositions. Accordingly, he distin-
guishes between relative and absolute presuppositions. A relative presupposi-
tion is a presupposition of some question, but an answer to some other question.
An absolute presupposition, though, is a presupposition to some question, but
answers no question at all [Collingwood 1998].
The function of metaphysics for Collingwood is to investigate the absolute
presuppositions of the natural sciences. These are ultimately the presupposi-
tions that concern existence and time and other topics that traditionally fall
within metaphysical inquiry and that shape the questions that scientists ask.
Thus metaphysics for Collingwood does not concern propositions at all, since
propositions answer some question, and metaphysics is concerned with absolute
presuppositions that answer no questions.
Several decades before Thomas Kuhn wrote of paradigms and scientific rev-
olutions [Kuhn 1996], Collingwood recognized that science changes from era to
era, and claimed that these changes can only occur when the absolute presup-
positions of science likewise change. Scientists ask different questions now than
they did in ancient or medieval times, and those different questions ultimately
rely on different absolute presuppositions, which form the object of study for
metaphysics. Consequently, metaphysics for Collingwood is fundamentally a
historical discipline, in that metaphysical questions ultimately become histori-
cal questions. In asking about the nature of existence, for example, the meta-
physician can only properly ask what conception of existence forms an absolute
presupposition to the scientific questions of some historical era.
By contrast, Edmund Husserl stoutly opposes the kind of historicism that
Collingwood embraces, along with practically every other form of relativism
[Husserl 2001, pp. 75-82], writing several decades before Collingwood. Husserl’s
solution to the kind of relativity that emerges from differences in presuppositions
is to turn away from those presuppositions and to turn toward what he calls
the things themselves. Yet for Husserl, these things are not Kantian things-in-
themselves, but rather the intentional objects that appear phenomenally to the
consciousness of the investigator [Husserl 1982].
Of course, there would seem to be a problem with these intentional objects
in that some of them clearly seem to exist, such as rocks and trees, while others
do not, such as centaurs and golden mountains. An investigation into what
does not exist would not seem to have the same value as an investigation into
what does exist, if indeed there is any value in investigating non-existents at
all.1 However, it is not always clear how to determine what exists and what
1Richard Routley [Routley 1980], [Routley 1982] and Graham Priest [Priest 2007] think
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does not. While rocks and trees seem to exist, Peter van Inwagen has noto-
riously argued that what exist are only living organisms and the elementary
simples that compose them [van Inwagen 1990]. So trees exist since they are
living organisms, but rocks do not. Of course, van Inwagen’s arguments rely on
certain presuppositions or constraints, as he put it, and he is perfectly honest
about these constraints. As he says, “most of what is said in this book can
be of little use to someone who accepts different constraints. And, sadly, the
reverse is true” [van Inwagen 1990, p. 14]. So the fundamental metaphysical
question of existence appears inextricably entangled in presuppositions, such
that it seems that any philosophical account of existence would be relative to
the presuppositions adopted in the methods of the investigator.
For Husserl, as with Kant and Heidegger, it seems that the structure of the
apparent problem suggests a clue to its solution. If the problem is that presup-
positions concerning existence influence the investigation into things themselves,
the solution for Husserl is simply to bracket the entire question of the existence
of the intentional objects that appear to consciousness and thereby to focus
attention on those objects as such and their structural relations to other such
objects in intentionality. Husserl claims that what emerges is a presupposition-
less science.
Yet it is not clear that Husserl’s method is completely free of all presuppo-
sitions. I would note that Schopenhauer had earlier claimed, “Every method in
philosophy which is ostensibly without any assumption is humbug; for we must
always regard something as given in order to start therefrom” [Schopenhauer 2000,
p. 33]. So while Husserl banishes existential presuppositions from his phe-
nomenological methodology, he does not thereby escape reliance on any pre-
suppositions at all. Worse still, in bracketing away existential presuppositions,
Husserl seems to be bracketing away much of traditional metaphysics that fo-
cuses specifically on questions of existence. So perhaps the phenomenological
method is useful in some fields of study, but for most metaphysical inquiry, it
would seem to be disastrous.
So, Collingwood and Husserl seem to offer bleak options with regard to
metaphysical inquiry. If presuppositions are fully acknowledged and embraced,
as with Collingwood, then metaphysical study becomes merely a relativist his-
torical inquiry. If, on the other hand, those presuppositions are eliminated or
at least minimized, as with Husserl, then metaphysics becomes significantly
impoverished as a field of study.
3 Perspectival Reduction
I have referred several times to the principle that the structure of an apparent
problem provides a clue to its solution. If the problem is that philosophical and
metaphysical results are relative to the presuppositions inherent in the methods
that yield those results, the structure of this problem accordingly suggests a
solution. I would propose that the apparent relativity of metaphysical results
there is some value, and I am sympathetic to their arguments.
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to methodological presuppositions be accepted as a methodological expedient,
though not necessarily as an assertion of truth. There is an appearance of rela-
tivity, but there is a further question whether this relativity is merely apparent
or is real.
To test this apparent relativity, what is needed is a better understanding of
relativism itself, in order to determine what are the crucial theses in supporting
any claim of relativism. If any of these theses can be denied with regard to the
apparent relativity according to presuppositions, then the relativity is merely
apparent, not real. What emerges from this proposal is a meta-methodology
whereby any and all other methods are employed as perspectives on metaphys-
ical and philosophical topics, but these perspectives are used in order to trian-
gulate on more stable, non-perspectival results. I call this meta-methodology
perspectival reduction. What follows is only a brief summary of a more complete
explication of this method [Ressler forthcoming].
So, for some metaphysical topic, let any number of methods be used and
let the presuppositions of these methods be identified. Then there would ap-
pear to be an instance of relativity of the results of these methods to their
presuppositions. Now let the structure of this apparent relativity be examined
in order to determine whether this apparent relativity can be reduced to some
non-relativistic form.
In a previous study of relativism and its logic [Ressler 2009], I identified
three theses that must hold in any instance of relativism:
1. Formal Requirements: Whatever requirements must be satisfied in order
to claim that something is relative to something else.
2. Objective Equity : None of the perspectives is objectively preferable to any
other.
3. Incommensurability : The various perspectives cannot be fully coordinated
or calibrated between each other.
If any of these theses can be denied with regard to the apparent relativity
by presuppositions, then the apparent relativity will collapse into some non-
relativistic form. There is insufficient space here to investigate these three theses
in detail, but the way these theses can be denied with regard to metaphysical
methodology can be summarized as follows:
1. There are many formal requirements for relativity, but the most important
is that there must be disagreement between the various perspectives. If
every perspective agrees on certain metaphysical results, then it cannot be
said that those results are relative to anything. So if the same metaphys-
ical results emerge regardless of the presuppositions of the methods, then
the various perspectives will have triangulated on a single result, thus re-
ducing the apparent relativity. However, given widespread disagreement
in metaphysics and in philosophy in general, this way of reducing the
apparent relativity seems unlikely.
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2. If one perspective is objectively preferable to the others, then the apparent
relativity would also be reduced, since the objectively preferable perspec-
tive would appear to be the best candidate for truth, and the others would
seem to constitute errors. The key to this way of achieving perspectival
reduction is ensuring objectivity. If there are different standards of prefer-
ability, then the judgement of a preferable perspective will appear relative
to those standards, thus introducing another layer of relativity and subjec-
tivity in addition to the relativity according to presuppositions. It seems
the way to ensure objectivity in the judgement of a preferable perspec-
tive is to ensure that each perspective endorses the same standards of
evaluation. However, since different methods seem precisely to presup-
pose different standards of evaluation, this way of reducing the apparent
relativity also seems unlikely.
3. While most accounts of commensurability and incommensurability through-
out the twentieth century focus on semantic concerns with meaning, I
claim that the best way to understand commensurability with regard to
relativism is as a structural transformation of one perspective into another,
regardless of the meanings of terms within the various perspectives. The
paradigm model of this kind of commensurability is the Lorentz trans-
formations in the special theory of relativity, which provide equations
for transforming measurements of spatial and temporal intervals between
different inertial frameworks. Incommensurability is when no such trans-
formation is possible. So if the various perspectives on some metaphysical
topic can be transformed into each other by means of similar transforma-
tional rules, then it would seem that the account of this transformational
rule would itself constitute a metaphysical theory on that metaphysical
topic, just as the special theory of relativity that employs the Lorentz
transformations constitutes a theory of space and time. So if there were
a set of transformational rules that could coordinate all the various theo-
ries of the nature of truth, for example, then the philosophical account of
those transformational rules would constitute a more comprehensive the-
ory of truth than any of the other theories, which would merely constitute
perspectives on truth.
The search for commensurability rules seems the most promising way to
achieve perspectival reduction. While the first two ways seem already well
known in philosophical practice, most of which seems devoted to arguments
about why some favored position is preferable to all the others, the search for
commensurability rules does not seem to be well appreciated within philosoph-
ical practice, though there are some precedents in the history of philosophy.
Because this technique is not much used within philosophical practice, I am
encouraged to think that there could be great progress within metaphysics and
philosophy in general once this technique becomes more widely employed.
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4 The Dimensions of Metaphysics
Just as the Lorentz transformations rely on the recognition of spatial and tempo-
ral dimensions across which the transformations are performed, so too the search
for commensurability rules as part of a meta-methodology in metaphysics will
need to identify a number of dimensions across which transformations between
the various perspectives on metaphysics topics can be achieved. While it is pos-
sible that these dimensions might be epistemological or even ethical in nature,
it seems more likely from the nature of metaphysics itself that the fundamental
dimensions for commensurability between perspectives on metaphysical topics
will be metaphysical in nature. For example, some likely dimensions might be:
• Being and existence
• Object and entity
• Concrete and abstract
• Particular and universal
• Appearance and reality
• Fact and fiction
• Possible and actual
• Relative and absolute
• Truth and falsehood
Of course, these dimensions represent precisely the metaphysical topics on
which disagreements and differences between perspectives arise. Consequently,
there is a concern that the various problems in metaphysics are so intertwined
that no problem can be solved on one topic without also solving every other
metaphysical problem, with the consequence that metaphysics would seem to
require the formulation of grand unifying systems, as in the Hegelian period of
philosophy. Such systems are both difficult to formulate and difficult to evaluate.
Yet it is not clear that the identification of transformational dimensions must
result in such all-encompassing grand systems. Rather, it may be that perspecti-
val reduction could identify some minimal account of metaphysical topics across
other metaphysics dimensions without requiring the solution of all problems
within those dimensions themselves. So for example, in seeking commensura-
bility rules between various perspectives on the nature of truth and falsity, a
transformation might be performed across the dimension of relativity and abso-
luteness, let us suppose. However, not all problems concerning relativism would
need to be solved in order to devise transformation rules concerning the nature
of truth. Rather, it would seem that the role of the dimension of relativity
and absoluteness in the transformational rules concerning truth, coupled with
the problematic nature of relativism, would thereby provide an explanation of
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why the question of relative truth would arise. Once the problems concerning
relativity and absoluteness are also solved, then the question of relative truth
would thereby be answered, but the account of the transformational rules across
the dimension of relativity and absoluteness would provide an minimal account
of the nature of truth that would hold regardless of how questions of relativism
get resolved.
Thus the hope is that metaphysical problems can be solved in this incre-
mental manner without requiring grand unifying metaphysical systems. With
the identification of more solutions to metaphysical problems, an increasingly
more complete metaphysical system would begin to emerge, but such complete
systems would not be needed at the beginning in order for the method to pro-
ceed. Of course, whether this hope can be realized will only be determined by
working out particular commensurability rules on specific metaphysical topics,
not by speculating about it in the general manner adopted here.
5 Methodological Iteration
While perspectival reduction operates against the presuppositions of other philo-
sophical methodologies, I do not claim that the method of perspectival reduction
has no presuppositions itself. It must surely have some presuppositions, even if
I cannot articulate them all at this point.
Some may be tempted to see this situation as incoherent. Perspectival reduc-
tion presents itself as a methodology that operates against the presuppositions
of other methodologies in an attempt to transcend those presuppositions as a
means to triangulate on non-perspectival results. Yet this meta-methodology
has presuppositions of its own that would need to be transcended as well. How-
ever, I do not see any incoherence in the acknowledgement of presuppositions
in the method of perspectival reduction. Rather, what those presuppositions
suggest to me is that the implementation of perspectival reduction cannot be
completed within a single attempt, but must be part of an iterative process.
Suppose that an instance of perspectival reduction is completed on some
metaphysical topic, yielding some account of that topic by virtue of commen-
surability rules. This resulting account would seem to be another perspective
on the topic that is dependent in part on the presuppositions of the method of
perspectival reduction. Then let there be a second iteration of the method that
incorporates the results of that first iteration of perspectival reduction, along
with all of the perspectives employed within the first iteration, and let another
attempt at a perspectival reduction be performed.
The hope is that with further iterations, the process of perspectival reduction
will converge asymptotically on a single stable result that recurs regardless of
further iterations and regardless of whatever other perspectives are incorporated
within the implementation of perspectival reduction. Of course, there is no
guarantee at this point that such a stable result will always emerge. It may
happen that subsequent iterations of the method will alternate between several
different results, or that some other pattern will emerge. Such a circumstance
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would ultimately need to be evaluated in the specific context in which it emerges,
so I will not speculate here on what such patterns might mean.
Still, it should not be a surprise that the method of perspectival reduction
would turn out to be an iterative process, since the dialectics of philosophy
from the beginning appear to have required seemingly endless iterations. What
perspectival reduction provides, though, is a framework within which those di-
alectics can operate and in which progress on metaphysical and philosophical
topics can be gauged. That progress would consist in incorporating increasingly
more perspectives within a common account by means of commensurability
rules.
I have outlined here a perspectival method for addressing the potential rel-
ativity of metaphysical results according to the presuppositions of the methods
used to generate those results. There may indeed be other perspectival meth-
ods, but I think that there is a compelling case for pursuing the method of
perspectival reduction further. Since it incorporates all other methods and ap-
proaches as perspectives, this method uses everything that has transpired in
the history of philosophy and wastes nothing, unlike some other methods that
would discard earlier approaches as representing confusions or as faltering on
pseudo-problems.
With regard to metaphysics and philosophy in general, access to the objects
of study is somewhat problematic. On the one hand, these objects seem always
to be around us and within us, but on the other hand, the endless controversies
and disagreements in philosophy suggest that our cognitive access to these ob-
jects is not perfectly clear. One reason for this lack of clarity seems to be that
the methods by which we access those objects rely on differing presuppositions,
whether about those objects themselves or about the nature of knowing them.
Accordingly, I think it is important to take the problem of the apparent
relativity of metaphysical results to presuppositions very seriously, rather than
merely trusting some single methodology, whether it relies on an analysis of
language, on intuitions, on possible worlds, or on something else. Philosophy in
general, as with other disciplines, should always be seeking greater objectivity
in its practice. My argument here is that the use of perspectival methods is a
way to attain such objectivity.
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